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Losing Relevance: Quebec and the
Constitutional Politics of Language

EMMANUELLE RICHEZ*
This article asks whether Quebec has lost relevance in the constitutional politics of
language. It proposes a doctrinal analysis of the Supreme Court’s Charter jurisprudence,
with an emphasis on the most recent body of case law, and an assessment of its political
consequences in the area of language policy in Quebec. The article argues that constitutional
review has increasingly protected individual rights over Quebec’s collective right to maintain
its language and culture. This can be explained by the move towards an implacable parallel
constitutionalism and a redefinition of official minority linguistic rights in the jurisprudence,
as well as by the exhaustion of Quebec’s legislative counterattacks to court rulings. The
article concludes that Quebec is no longer driving concepts of Canadian citizenship. Undifferentiated rather than multinational citizenship appears to be the direction in which Charter
language jurisprudence is taking Canada.
Cet article soulève la question de savoir si le Québec a perdu sa pertinence dans la politique
constitutionnelle de la langue. Il propose une analyse doctrinale de la jurisprudence de
la Cour suprême relative à la Charte, en mettant l’accent sur le corpus le plus récent de
droit jurisprudentiel, de même qu’une évaluation de ses conséquences politiques dans le
domaine de la politique linguistique du Québec. L’article prétend que la révision constitutionnelle favorise de plus en plus les droits individuels au détriment du droit collectif du
Québec de conserver sa langue et sa culture. Cela peut s’expliquer par un glissement vers
un implacable constitutionnalisme parallèle et une redéfinition des droits linguistiques de
la minorité officielle dans la jurisprudence, ainsi que par l’épuisement de la contre-attaque
législative du Québec aux décisions des tribunaux. L’article conclut que le Québec n’est plus
le moteur des concepts de la citoyenneté canadienne. La jurisprudence de la Charte sur la
langue semble désormais conduire le Canada vers un concept de citoyenneté indifférencié
plutôt que multinational.
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WHEN THE CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS1 (Charter) was first

adopted, its potential impact on the balance between individual and collective
rights in Canada was much debated. Although some authors contended that
the Charter was mostly a vehicle for liberal individualism,2 others thought that
it retained elements of communitarianism.3 Quebec had refused to ratify the
Charter precisely because it not only failed to recognize the province’s distinct or
national character, but also because it severely reduced Quebec’s power to legislate
in the area of language policy—a power that would help the province to preserve
its Francophone culture.4 Whether Quebec has been the biggest loser under the
Charter is a matter of debate. On the one hand, only a decade after the adoption of
the Charter, many authors pointed out that the judiciary had nullified more laws
in Quebec than in any other province, and that those laws touched on language, a
crucial policy area for the maintenance of Quebec’s unique Francophone identity
1.
2.

3.
4.

Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c
11 [Charter].
See e.g. Allan C Cairns, “Constitutional Change and the Three Equalities” in Ronald L Watts
& Douglas M Brown, eds, Options for a New Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1991) 77; Michael Mandel, The Charter of Rights and the Legalization of Politics in Canada
(Toronto: Thompson Educational, 1994).
See e.g. Patrick Monahan, Politics and the Constitution: The Charter, Federalism, and the
Supreme Court of Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 1987) [Monahan, Politics]; David J Elkins,
“Facing Our Destiny: Rights and Canadian Distinctiveness” (1989) 22:4 Can J Pol Sci 699.
See e.g. Mandel, supra note 2; Guy Laforest, Pour la liberté d’une société distincte. Parcours d’un
intellectuel engagé (Sainte-Foy, Que: Presses de l’Université Laval, 2004).

RICHEZ, LOSING RELEVANCE 193

in North America.5 On the other hand, some authors contended that the negative
impact of the Charter on Quebec’s Francophone identity was overstated, notably
because Quebec retained the power under the new constitutional linguistic
regime to limit immigrants’ access to English schools by channelling them into
the French education system.6 However, the Supreme Court of Canada has
recently questioned this power in Gosselin (Tutor of ) v Quebec (Attorney General)7
and limited it in Solski (Tutor of ) v Quebec (Attorney General)8 and Nguyen v
Quebec (Education, Recreation and Sports).9
This trilogy of cases shows that the debate on the nature of the rights
embodied in the Charter remains salient. This article therefore seeks to evaluate
whether Quebec has lost relevance in the constitutional politics of language. More
specifically, it proposes a doctrinal analysis of the Court’s Charter jurisprudence
(with an emphasis on the most recent case law) and an assessment of its political
consequences in the area of language policy in Quebec. The article argues that
constitutional review has increasingly protected individual rights over Quebec’s
collective right to maintain its language and culture. This development can be
explained by the move towards an implacable parallel constitutionalism and a
redefinition of official minority linguistic rights in the jurisprudence, as well as by
the exhaustion of Quebec’s legislative counterattacks to court rulings. The article
concludes that Quebec is no longer driving concepts of Canadian citizenship.
Charter language jurisprudence appears to be taking Canada in the direction
of undifferentiated rather than multinational citizenship. Before tackling these
5.

6.

7.
8.
9.

See Guy Laforest, Trudeau and the End of a Canadian Dream, translated by Paul Leduc
Browne & Michelle Weinroth (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1995); Yves
de Montigny, “The Impact (Real or Apprehended) of the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms on the Legislative Authority of Quebec” in David Schneiderman & Kate
Sutherland, eds, Charting the Consequences: The Impact of Charter Rights on Canadian Law
and Politics (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997) 3; FL Morton, “Judicial Politics
Canadian-Style: The Supreme Court’s Contribution to the Constitutional Crisis of 1992” in
Curtis Cook, ed, Constitutional Predicament: Canada after the Referendum of 1992 (Montreal:
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1994) 132.
See especially James B Kelly, “Reconciling Rights and Federalism during Review of the
Charter of Rights and Freedoms: The Supreme Court of Canada and the Centralization
Thesis, 1982 to 1999” (2001) 34:2 Can J Pol Sci 321; Peter H Russell, “The Political
Purposes of the Charter: Have They Been Fulfilled? An Agnostic’s Report Card” in Philip
Bryden, Steven Davis & John Russell, eds, Protecting Rights and Freedoms: Essays on the
Charter’s Place in Canada’s Political, Legal, and Intellectual Life (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1994) 33 [Russell, “Political”].
2005 SCC 15, [2005] 1 SCR 238 [Gosselin].
2005 SCC 14, [2005] 1 SCR 201 [Solski].
2009 SCC 47, [2009] 3 SCR 208 [Nguyen].
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issues, this article shows how the content and scope of language rights have
evolved in Quebec since Confederation as well as how they have influenced
conceptions of Canadian citizenship.

I. LANGUAGE RIGHTS IN QUEBEC AND CANADIAN
CITIZENSHIP
Citizenship is a multifaceted concept that gives rise to many definitional and
theoretical challenges.10 A recurring theme in the literature is the primordial link
between citizenship and access to rights in liberal democracies. In his famous
essay Citizenship and Social Class, T.H. Marshall argued that citizenship consists
of political, civil, and social rights brought about by the modern capitalist order.11
This rights-based vision of citizenship has since been enlarged to include cultural
rights, such as linguistic rights.12 The nature of the cultural rights granted in
any polity informs its type of citizenship. At one end of the spectrum lies the
“universal” or “undifferentiated” conception of citizenship, which recognizes the
right-bearing equality of individuals and is blind to cultural group differences.
At the other end is the “pluralist” or “differentiated” conception of citizenship,
which posits that substantive equality requires a differential treatment of certain
cultural groups.13
Differentiated citizenship can take many forms depending on the level of
diversity that it promotes and how it translates into rights and policies. Will
Kymlicka distinguishes “polyethnic” citizenship from “multinational” citizenship.14 Polyethnic citizenship is associated with group-differentiated rights for
immigrants, which promote cultural retention by, for example, funding ethnocultural activities and conferring exemption rights. Polyethnic citizenship also
insists, however, on the necessity of facilitating integration into mainstream
10. See Linda Bosniak, “Citizenship Denationalized” (2000) 7:2 Ind J Global Legal Stud 447;
Will Kymlicka & Wayne Norman, “Return of the Citizen: A Survey of Recent Work on
Citizenship Theory” (1994) 104:2 Ethics 352; Peter H Schuck, “Citizenship in Federal
Systems” (2000) 48:2 Am J Comp L 195; Jane Jenson, “Introduction: Thinking about
Citizenship and Law in an Era of Change” in Law Commission of Canada, ed, Law and
Citizenship (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2006) 3.
11. Citizenship and Social Class: and other essays (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press,
1950).
12. See especially Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).
13. Iris Marion Young, “Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal
Citizenship” (1989) 99:2 Ethics 250.
14. Supra note 12.
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society by providing official language training. Because it often recognizes all
cultural differences equally, polyethnic citizenship is close to the undifferentiated
model on the citizenship spectrum. In contrast, multinational citizenship provides
self-government rights to national minorities such as French Quebeckers, to help
them counter cultural assimilation into the dominant society and maintain a
distinct collective identity.15
Alan Patten and Will Kymlicka argue that the recognition of language rights
is inextricably linked to the establishment of multinationalism.16 They categorize
language rights and policies according to four distinctions: “(1) tolerance- vs
promotion-oriented rights; (2) norm-and-accommodation vs official-languages
rights regimes; (3) personality vs territoriality rights regimes; and (4) individual
vs collective rights.”17 National minorities expect not only tolerance rights, which
prevent state intervention in an individual’s private language choices, but also
promotion-oriented rights, which require the use of the minorities’ languages
within state institutions.18 They also prefer the establishment of an officiallanguage rights regime, as opposed to simple accommodations for members who
lack proficiency in the language of the majority.19
The distinctions between personality- and territoriality-based linguistic rights
regimes and between individual and collective linguistic rights are important
to the establishment of a multinational citizenship. Linguistic rights regimes
can be organized on the territoriality principle, according to which “languages
rights should vary from region to region according to local conditions,” or on
the personality principle, according to which “citizens should enjoy the same
set of (official) language rights no matter where they are in the country.”20
The self-government rights associated with the multinational model imply the
capacity to impose a linguistic regime on a delimited territory. As for the collective
aspect of language rights, it manifests itself when enforcement of the rights is
dependent on a certain threshold level of demand (and therefore on the existence
15. Ibid. It should be noted that Kymlicka’s protection of collective identities finds its
justification in individual autonomy. For a different view, see Dwight Newman, “Putting
Kymlicka in Perspective: Canadian Diversity and Collective Rights” in Stephen Tierney, ed,
Accommodating Cultural Diversity (Hampshire, UK: Ashgate, 2007) 59.
16. “Introduction” in Will Kymlicka & Alan Patten, eds, Language Rights and Political Theory
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2003) 1 at 5.
17. Ibid at 26.
18. Ibid at 27. See also Heinz Kloss, “Language Rights of Immigrant Groups” (1971) 5:2 Int’l
Migr Rev 250.
19. Patten & Kymlicka, supra note 16 at 27-29.
20. Ibid at 29.
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of a community) or when the primary intended beneficiary of the rights is a
collectivity as opposed to individuals.21 The collective goals pursued by national
minorities are either linguistic security or linguistic survival.22 Significant here are
“external protections,” which refer to the national minority’s ability to “protect
its distinct existence and identity by limiting the impact of the decisions of the
larger society.”23 External protection measures have been implemented by the
government of Quebec to limit access to public English schools.24
Quebec’s use of external protections has conflicted with the recognition of
the linguistic rights of members of its Anglophone minority.25 For Patten and
Kymlicka, these rights fall into the collective rights category by virtue of being
group-differentiated.26 As Denise G. Réaume explains, the group-differentiated
rights of English and French minorities, though granted to individuals, aim at
protecting language communities.27 Anglophones in Quebec have traditionally
favoured an undifferentiated citizenship, however. More specifically, they would
prefer no state intervention by Quebec in linguistic matters, along with the
promotion of individuals’ equal right to choose their preferred language in the
public sphere. Nonetheless, the very existence of the rights of Anglophones in
Quebec depends upon, or is at least intimately related to, the notion of multinational citizenship. That is, if Quebec did not have important self-government
rights regarding language, minority language rights for Anglophones in Quebec
would be unnecessary. Just as the minority language rights given to Francophones
outside Quebec are extensions of the national minority rights of Francophone
Quebeckers,28 minority language rights given to Anglophone Quebeckers can be
seen as an extension of the rights of the Anglophone-Canadian majority.
It is interesting to examine how the different conceptions of citizenship have
conflicted and prevailed in Canada over time. Of particular relevance is Quebec’s
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

26.
27.
28.

Ibid at 30.
Ibid at 31.
Kymlicka, supra note 12 at 36.
These external restrictions can also be seen as internal restrictions, as they restrict the
linguistic rights of Francophone Quebeckers, who are themselves internal members of the
collectivity being protected. See Newman, supra note 15.
Denise G Réaume, “Beyond Personality: The Territorial and Personal Principles of Language
Policy Reconsidered” in Kymlicka & Patten, supra note 16, 271; FL Morton, “Group Rights
Versus Individual Rights in the Charter: The Special Cases of Natives and the Quebecois”
in Neil Nevitte & Allan Kornberg, eds, Minorities and the Canadian State (Oakville, Ont:
Mosaic Press, 1985) 71 [Morton, “Charter”].
Supra note 16 at 30.
Supra note 25 at 288. Contra Morton, “Charter,” supra note 25 at 71-72.
Kymlicka, supra note 12 at 45-46.
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linguistic rights system and its impact on the character of Canadian citizenship
on the whole. The following paragraphs explore three key legal texts that have
redefined Quebec’s linguistic regime and have inevitably influenced the direction
in which Canadian citizenship has gone: the Constitution Act, 1867,29 the Charter
of the French language30 (Bill 101), and the Charter.31
First, the Constitution Act, 1867 established both French and English as
the languages of the legislatures and the courts under section 133.32 It also, via
section 93, guaranteed rights to denominational schools,33 which at the time
of enactment were divided along linguistic lines. By doing so, the Constitution
Act, 1867 recognized group-differentiated rights of French Catholics and English
Protestants. Most importantly, the Constitution Act, 1867 created Canadian
federalism via sections 91–95, which relate to the division of powers between
the federal and provincial governments.34 Many argue that a federal system was
chosen to grant the province of Quebec the powers necessary for the cultural
survival of its Francophone majority within a larger union, in exchange for
Quebec’s adherence to the Confederation project.35 Thus, the powers given to the
Province of Quebec, notably including exclusive jurisdiction over education and
civil rights, have amounted to self-government rights for the French-Quebecker
majority, since it controlled the provincial state apparatus.36 Moreover, the territorially based collective rights given to French Quebeckers signified that Canadian
citizenship was to some extent binational.37
Second, the Province of Quebec furthered the differentiation of Canadian
citizenship by taking its linguistic destiny into its own hands. After the Quiet
Revolution, multiple Quebec governments enacted several pieces of legislation
intended to safeguard the vitality of the French language in the province,
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

36.
37.

(UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, reprinted in RSC 1985, App II, No 5.
CQLR c C-11 [Bill 101].
Supra note 1.
Supra note 29, s 133. The use of both French and English is permitted in the Parliament of
Canada and the National Assembly of Quebec (ibid).
Ibid, s 93.
Ibid, ss 91-95.
See e.g. Samuel V LaSelva, The Moral Foundations of Canadian Federalism: Paradoxes,
Achievements, and Tragedies of Nationhood (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press,
1996); Gil Rémillard, Le fédéralisme canadien: éléments constitutionnels de formation et
d’évolution (Montréal: Québec/Amérique, 1980).
Because of this development, the terms “government of Quebec” and “French Quebeckers”
are used interchangeably in this article.
See especially Joseph Eliot Magnet, “Collective Rights, Cultural Autonomy and the
Canadian State” (1986) 32:1 McGill LJ 170.
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culminating in the adoption of Bill 101 by the Parti Québécois in 1977. This law,
which has quasi-constitutional status in Quebec, notably advanced the francization of the workplace by requiring that all firms of fifty or more employees
operate in French38 and that all public and commercial signs use only French.39
Bill 101 also reduced the accessibility of English-language instruction by
restricting it to children whose parents had received primary school instruction in
English in the province of Quebec.40 While this “Quebec clause,” as it is known,
was written in individualistic terms, it had a collective purpose. This external
protection was put in place to ensure that immigrant groups, whether from other
Canadian provinces or other countries, would integrate into the French majority
culture. Concurrently, the Quebec government tried to gain more power over
immigration, a federal area of jurisdiction, in order to favour the establishment
of French-speaking migrants in its territory. To this effect, Quebec signed several
bilateral agreements with the federal government in the 1970s.41 Still, due to the
socioeconomic appeal of the English language as compared to French, the high
rate of newcomers’ linguistic transfers to English dampened the hope of survival
of the French fact in North America. By making French the common and sole
language of public life, Bill 101 consolidated the concept of a distinctive Quebec
citizenship within Canada.42
Finally, the Charter broke with the spirit of the Constitution Act, 1867 by
imposing limits on the powers of the Quebec government, and thus the territorial
collective rights of French Quebeckers (notably in the area of language), to the
benefit of individual citizens.43 By promoting an individualized bilingualism as
opposed to a territorialized one, the Charter also clashed with the purpose of Bill
38. Bill 101, supra note 30, s 136, as amended by An Act to harmonize public statutes with the
Civil Code, SQ 1999, c 40, s 45.
39. Bill 101, supra note 30, s 58.
40. Ibid, s 73(a), as repealed by An Act to amend the Charter of the French language, SQ 1993, c
40, s 15 [Bill 86].
41. Such agreements include the Lang-Cloutier Agreement (1971), the Andras-Bienvenue
Agreement (1975), and the Cullen-Couture Agreement (1979). For a brief discussion
of these agreements, see Stella Burch Elias, “Comprehensive Immigration Reform(s):
Immigration Regulation Beyond Our Borders” (2014) 39:1 Yale J Int’l L 37 at 73-74.
42. Alain-G Gagnon & Raffaele Iacovino, “Interculturalism: Expanding the Boundaries of
Citizenship” in Alain-G Gagnon, ed, Québec: State and Society, 3d ed (Peterborough, Ont:
Broadview Press, 2004) 369.
43. Eugénie Brouillet, “La charte de la langue française et la Charte canadienne des droits et
libertés: la difficile conciliation des logiques majoritaires et minoritaire” in Marcel Martel &
Martin Pâquet, eds, Légiférer en matière linguistique (Quebec: Presses de l’Université Laval,
2008) 359 at 368-73.
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101. First, the Charter guarantees civil rights, such as the individual freedom of
expression (section 2(b)) and the right to equality (section 15), which prohibits
discrimination based on ascriptive traits.44 Second, it confers group-differentiated
rights to members of official language minorities (sections 16–23).45 Sections
16–22 of the Charter make French and English the official languages in the
operations of the federal government and the government of New Brunswick.
These sections extend the rights found in section 133 of the Constitution Act,
1867 and constitutionalize the principles of the Official Languages Act46 of 1969.
The addition of education rights for members of linguistic minorities (section
23) to the constitutional edifice of Canada was a novelty.47 Although denominational education rights have been protected since Confederation, the courts had
ruled that they did not include education rights for linguistic minorities.48
While Quebec language policy has been challenged under sections 2(b)
and 15 of the Charter, it has mostly been challenged under section 23 of the
Charter. At first glance, the detailed nature of Anglophones’ education rights
interferes directly with Quebec’s constitutional power to legislate in the field of
education.49 For example, section 23(1)(b) of the Charter, known as the “Canada
clause,” was included specifically to invalidate the Quebec clause in Bill 101. The
Canada clause provides that all children whose parents received primary school
instruction in English anywhere in Canada, not just in the province of Quebec,
have the right to minority language education in Quebec.50 Section 23 rights
were thus modelled on the personality principle, whereby rights are available
to individuals irrespective of their geographical location. Although these rights
are exercised individually, they are conditional on the existence of a linguistic
community and thus maintain a territorial element.51 Section 23(3)(a) notably
provides that these rights can only be granted where a sufficient number of rights-

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Charter, supra note 1, ss 2(b), 15.
Ibid, ss 16-23.
RSC 1985, c 31 (4th Supp).
Charter, supra note 1, s 23.
See Ottawa Separate Schools Trustees v Mackell, [1916] UKPC 92, [1917] AC 62; Protestant
School Board of Greater Montreal v Quebec (Minister of Education), [1976] CS 430, 83 DLR
(3d) 645.
49. Mandel, supra note 2 at 142.
50. Supra note 1, s 23(1)(b).
51. Monahan, Politics, supra note 3 at 112; Vanessa Gruben, “Language Rights in Canada: A
Theoretical Approach” (2008) 39 Sup Ct L Rev (2d) 91 at 115-16.
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holders exist in a particular area to warrant the public funding of the requisite
educational facilities.52
These limitations notwithstanding, the Constitution Act, 1982 provides
remedial mechanisms for Quebec to protect its self-government rights concerning
language policy. First, section 59 exempts Quebec from having to comply with
section 23(1)(a) of the Charter.53 Known as the “mother tongue clause,” section
59 guarantees a minority language education right to Canadian citizens whose
“first language learned and still understood is that of the … linguistic minority
population of the province.”54 Quebec had attempted a mother tongue regime
with the adoption of Bill 2255 in 1974 and was of the view that it had failed.56 Not
only was it difficult to apply in practice, it prompted the integration of a majority
of Allophones57 into the English-language education system.58 The exemption
found in section 59 was thus intended to assuage Quebec’s concerns.59
Second, the limitation clause found in section 1 of the Charter provides that
rights and freedoms are “subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by
law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.”60 In the
context of judicial review, the onus is on the government to demonstrate that its

52. Charter, supra note 1, s 23(3). Section 23(3) reads as follows:
The right of citizens of Canada under subsections (1) and (2) to have their children receive
primary and secondary school instruction in the language of the English or French linguistic
minority population of a province (a) applies wherever in the province the number of children
of citizens who have such a right is sufficient to warrant the provision to them out of public
funds of minority language instruction … .

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Constitution Act, 1982, s 59, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11.
Charter, supra note 1, s 23(1)(a).
Official Language Act, SQ 1974, c 6, ss 40-41.
Jean-Pierre Proulx, “Le choc des Chartes: histoire des régimes juridiques québécois et
canadien en matière de langue d’enseignement” (1989) 23:1 RJT 67 at 110-13.
An Allophone is an individual whose mother tongue is not the official language of the
territory where he or she resides. In Quebec, an individual whose mother tongue is neither
French nor English is considered an Allophone.
Proulx, supra note 56.
Ibid at 163-67.
Supra note 1.
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impugned legislation withstands a section 1 analysis according to the Oakes test.61
As Janet L. Hiebert explains:
An expansive interpretation of section 1 would allow Parliament and the provincial
legislatures to promote, where justified, values other than those specifically enumerated in the Charter. This would enrich the Charter by embracing collective values
that, like individual rights, are relevant to Canadian conceptions of a just and democratic society yet are not adequately captured by the Charter’s highly individualist
language.62

Indeed, section 1 gives Quebec the opportunity to justify limits on
individuals’ language rights on the basis that such limits are necessary to allow
the province’s collective French language culture to flourish.
Third, section 33 of the Charter, better known as the “derogatory clause”
or the “notwithstanding clause,” can be used by the federal or provincial
governments to immunize their legislative acts from past or future judicial review
under the Charter. This section stipulates that “Parliament or the legislature of a
province may expressly declare in an Act of Parliament or of the legislature, as the
case may be, that the Act or a provision thereof shall operate notwithstanding a
provision included in section 2 or sections 7 to 15 of this Charter.”63 This clause
imposes a five-year limitation period after which the concerned government
must comply with Charter requirements or re-enact the overriding provision.
The official language and education rights in the Charter are not subject to the
notwithstanding clause, however. This fact significantly limits Quebec’s capacity
to affirm its parliamentary authority in language policy matters.

61. The Court developed a test for the application of the limitation clause in R v Oakes. See R
v Oakes, [1986] 1 SCR 103, 53 OR (2d) 719. The Oakes test was later clarified in Egan v
Canada. See Egan v Canada, [1995] 2 SCR 513 at para 182, 124 DLR (4th) 609. In Egan v
Canada, Iacobucci J states that:
First, the objective of the legislation must be pressing and substantial. Second, the means
chosen to attain this legislative end must be reasonable and demonstrably justifiable in a free
and democratic society. In order to satisfy the second requirement, three criteria must be
satisfied: (1) the rights violation must be rationally connected to the aim of the legislation; (2)
the impugned provision must minimally impair the Charter guarantee; and (3) there must be
a proportionality between the effect of the measure and its objective so that the attainment
of the legislative goal is not outweighed by the abridgement of the right. In all s. 1 cases the
burden of proof is with the government to show on a balance of probabilities that the violation
is justifiable.

62. Limiting Rights: The Dilemma of Judicial Review (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press,
1996) at 138.
63. Charter, supra note 1, s 33.
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Overall, the adoption of the Charter signalled an important step towards
an undifferentiated Canadian citizenship in which primacy is given to the
rights-bearing equality of individuals as opposed to the self-government rights
of collectivities.64 Quebec was not able to prevent this ideological turn and
subsequently faced its consequences through Charter-based judicial review. While
the Charter provides an inherent logic to guide judicial review, judicial discretion
remains wide. Judges can interpret the Charter in a restrictive or non-restrictive fashion. Furthermore, Quebec can influence the outcome of Charter-based
judicial review through its legislative responses to court decisions. According
to constitutional dialogue theory, elected officials can “revers[e], modif[y], or
avoi[d]”65 unfavourable judgments. Nevertheless, as will be seen in the following
sections, Charter-based judicial review in the area of language policy has been
unfavourable towards Quebec.

II. EARLY LANGUAGE RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE: THE PATH
TOWARDS LINGUISTIC PEACE
All Supreme Court of Canada Charter cases originating from Quebec in the
area of minority language rights have challenged important provisions of Bill
101. Immediately after the enactment of the Charter, the National Assembly
retrospectively invoked the notwithstanding clause to protect all of its legislation
in An Act respecting the Constitution Act, 198266 (Bill 62). The concrete effect
of Bill 62 was to re-enact all Quebec statutes that had been enacted before the
64. See especially Jane Jenson, “Citizenship and Equity: Variations across Time and in Space” in
Janet Hiebert, ed, Political Ethics: A Canadian Perspective, vol 12 (Ottawa, Toronto; Royal
Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing, Dundurn Press, 1991) 195 [Jenson,
“Citizenship and Equity”]; Pierre Elliott Trudeau, “The Values of a Just Society” in Thomas S
Axworthy & Pierre Elliott Trudeau, eds, Towards a Just Society: The Trudeau Years (Markham,
Ont: Viking, 1990) 357.
65. Peter W Hogg & Allison A Bushell, “The Charter Dialogue between Courts and Legislatures
(Or Perhaps The Charter of Rights Isn’t Such A Bad Thing After All” (1997) 35:1 Osgoode
Hall LJ 75 at 80. For further discussions on constitutional dialogue theory, see Christopher
P Manfredi & James B Kelly, “Six Degrees of Dialogue: A Response to Hogg and Bushell”
(1999) 37:3 Osgoode Hall LJ 513; Matthew A Hennigar, “Expanding the ‘Dialogue’
Debate: Canadian Federal Government Responses to Lower Court Charter Decisions”
(2004) 37:1 Can J Pol Sci 3; James B Kelly, Governing with the Charter: Legislative and
Judicial Activism and Framers’ Intent (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005); Peter W Hogg, Allison
A Bushell Thornton & Wade K Wright, “Charter Dialogue Revisited—Or ‘Much Ado about
Metaphors’” (2007) 45:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 1.
66. RSQ c L-4.2 [Bill 62].
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Charter came into force, with the addition of an override clause providing that
the statutes would operate notwithstanding a provision included in section 2 or
sections 7–15 of the Charter. However, this blanket override strategy did not
prevent Bill 101 from being challenged under section 23 of the Charter. The
period that followed the passage of Bill 62 took on the appearance of a language
war that was played out in the courts between the Quebec government and the
Anglo-Quebecker community.
A. AG (QUE) V QUEBEC PROTESTANT SCHOOL BOARDS (1984)

The first case challenging Bill 101 under section 23 of the Charter to reach
the Court was AG (Que) v Quebec Protestant School Boards.67 The unanimous
decision declared that the provisions regarding instruction in English found in
sections 72–73 of Bill 101, which comprise the Quebec clause, were inconsistent
with the Canada clause of section 23(1)(b) of the Charter. It also stated that
the impugned provisions could not be saved under section 1 of the Charter.
The Court established that the minority language education rights found in the
Charter had been adopted precisely to “remedy the perceived defects” of Quebec’s
language policy.68 The remedial nature of section 23 was made clear by the use
of terminology and criteria similar to those used in Bill 101. Consequently, the
Court reasoned that the Charter’s framers could not possibly have believed that
the defects in Quebec’s language policy could be justifiable within the ambit of
section 1. Furthermore, the Court noted that the Charter’s framers had Quebec’s
immigration concerns in mind when they exempted the Province from having to
comply with the mother tongue clause of section 23(1)(a).
Enrolment in publicly funded English schools in Quebec did not increase
significantly following the decision in Quebec Protestant School Boards. A year
before the Court’s decision, the Quebec National Assembly had already amended
Bill 101 in response to the lower courts’ unfavourable rulings in the case. The
purpose of the amending legislation, An Act to amend the Charter of the French
language69 (Bill 57), was to consolidate the special status and rights of the Quebec
Anglophone community. Bill 57 widened the admission criteria for English
instruction with the introduction of what is known as the “major part” requirement.70 The new law provided that children whose parents had received the
“major part” of their primary education in English in Quebec would have access
67.
68.
69.
70.

[1984] 2 SCR 66, 10 DLR (4th) 321 [Quebec Protestant School Boards cited to SCR].
Ibid at 79.
SQ 1983, c 56, amending Bill 101, supra note 30 [Bill 57].
Bill 57, supra note 69, ss 15, 20, amending Bill 101, supra note 30, ss 73(a)-(b), 86.1(a).
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to public English instruction.71 Prior to this amendment, the governmental
admissibility bureau had interpreted the Quebec clause as guaranteeing access
to English schools only for children whose parents had received the “totality” of
their primary instruction in English in Quebec, whereas the appeal commission
had applied the “major part” requirement.72 The Quebec government decided to
resolve the conflict in favour of the Anglophone community, which wished to
increase eligibility for English schooling.73
Furthermore, Bill 57 accepted the Canada clause but imposed two
limitations on it.74 Since the enactment of Bill 101, the Quebec government
had consistently issued certificates of exemption allowing Canadians who had
received their education in English outside of Quebec to send their children
to publicly funded English schools, thereby informally enforcing the Canada
clause.75 Bill 57 legalized this practice, but kept it discretionary as opposed to a
guaranteed objective right.76 Bill 57 also added the requirement that to qualify for
exemption, parents must have received their English instruction in a province that
offered instruction to Francophones that was similar to the minority-language
instruction offered to Anglophones in Quebec.77 At the time, most Canadian
provinces had underdeveloped educational systems for Francophone minorities78
and only New Brunswick was deemed to provide adequate minority language
education.79 Although in theory Bill 57 allowed the Quebec government to
refuse public English instruction to the children of out-of-province Anglophone
Canadians, more importantly, it allowed the Quebec government to pressure

71. Bill 57, supra note 69, s 15, amending Bill 101, supra note 30, s 73(a).
72. Quebec, National Assembly, Journal des débats, 32nd Leg, 4th Sess, vol 27, No 199 (13
December 1983) at B-10876 (Camille Laurin).
73. Ibid.
74. Supra note 69, s 20, amending Bill 101, supra note 30, s 86.1.
75. See Edward McWhinney, Canada and the Constitution 1979-1982: Patriation and the Charter
of Rights (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982) at 96.
76. Supra note 69, s 20, amending Bill 101, supra note 30, s 86.1.
77. Ibid.
78. Michael D Behiels, Canada’s Francophone Minority Communities: Constitutional Renewal and
the Winning of School Governance (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2004).
79. Order in Council respecting the application of section 86.1 of the Charter of the French language
to English-speaking persons from New Brunswick, CQLR c C-11, r 2.
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other Canadian provinces to develop better services for Francophones outside
Quebec.80
Finally, Bill 57 attempted to immunize Bill 101 from future legal challenges
by amending it to include a standard override provision.81 However, the
notwithstanding clause could not be invoked by the Quebec government in
Quebec Protestant School Boards since section 23 of the Charter is shielded from
its prerogative. The clause would later be used, however, in response to cases
pertaining to freedom of expression.
A. FORD V QUEBEC (ATTORNEY GENERAL) (1988) AND DEVINE V QUEBEC
(ATTORNEY GENERAL) (1988)

Bill 101’s legislative scheme pertaining to the language of commerce and business
was challenged before the Court in Ford v Quebec (Attorney General)82 and Devine
v Quebec (Attorney General).83 In Ford, the Court found that sections 58 and 69
of Bill 101 violated the freedom of expression guaranteed by section 2(b) of the
Charter.84 Section 58 required all public signs and posters, along with commercial
advertising, to be solely in French.85 Section 69 required firms in the province to
use only the French versions of their names.86 In Devine, the Court ruled that
sections 59–61 of Bill 101,87 which created exceptions to section 58, were of
80. In 1977, at the Annual Premiers’ Conference in St. Andrews, New Brunswick, Quebec
Premier René Lévesque claimed that he was willing to implement the Canada clause formally
if the English-speaking provinces would reciprocate by guaranteeing to Francophone
minorities access to French schooling. See McWhinney, supra note 75 at 51; Proulx, supra
note 56 at 124.
81. Supra note 30, s 52.
82. [1988] 2 SCR 712, 54 DLR (4th) 577 [Ford cited to SCR].
83. [1988] 2 SCR 790, 55 DLR (4th) 641 [Devine].
84. Supra note 82.
85. Supra note 30, s 58.
86. Ibid, s 69.
87. Ibid, ss 59-61. Sections 60 and 61 of the Charter of the French language were repealed in 1988
and 1993, respectively. See An Act to amend the Charter of the French language, SQ 1988, c
54, ss 3-4, amending Bill 101, supra note 30, ss 60-61 [Bill 178]; Bill 86, supra note 40, ss
59-61 read:
59. Section 58 does not apply to advertising carried in news media that publish in a language
other than French, or to messages of a religious, political, ideological or humanitarian nature
if not for a profit motive.
60. Firms employing not over four persons including the employer may erect signs and posters
in both French and another language in their establishments. However, the inscriptions in
French must be given at least as prominent display as those in the other language.
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no force or effect since they were connected to the general rule found in section
58.88 The only provisions of Bill 101 to have escaped judicial invalidation under
the Charter were sections 5289 and 57,90 which survived because they permitted
the use of French together with another language when read with section 89.91
In addition, the Court declared that the standard override provision that had
been adopted previously only partially protected Bill 101 from the application of
section 2(b) of the Charter.92
In Ford, the Court found that the constitutional freedom of expression
included “the freedom to express oneself in the language of one’s choice”:93
Language is so intimately related to the form and content of expression that there
cannot be true freedom of expression by means of language if one is prohibited from
using the language of one’s choice. Language is not merely a means or medium of
expression; it colours the content and meaning of expression. It is, as the preamble
of the Charter of the French Language itself indicates, a means by which a people may
express its cultural identity. It is also the means by which the individual expresses his
or her personal identity and sense of individuality.94

Freedom of expression was also extended to commercial expression. In
RWDSU v Dolphin Delivery Ltd.,95 the Court had already established that freedom
of expression extends beyond political expression. Adopting a purposive approach
in Ford, the Court held that commercial expression plays a key role in a free and
democratic society, “enabling individuals to make informed economic choices,
an important aspect of individual self-fulfillment and personal autonomy.”96
So, although freedom of expression can generally be justified according to the
benefits it confers on the speaker, its extension to commercial expression was
justified by the benefits it confers on listeners.

61. Signs and posters respecting the cultural activities of a particular ethnic group in any way
may be in both French and the language of that ethnic group.

88. Supra note 83.
89. Supra note 30, s 53. Section 53 reads: “Catalogues, brochures, folders and similar
publications must be drawn up in French.”
90. Ibid, s 57. Section 57 reads: “Application forms for employment, order forms, invoices,
receipts and quittances shall be drawn up in French.”
91. Ibid, s 89. Section 89 reads: “Where this Act does not require the use of the official language
exclusively, the official language and another language may be used together.”
92. Devine, supra note 83.
93. Supra note 82 at 748-49.
94. Ibid.
95. [1986] 2 SCR 573, 9 BCLR (2d) 273.
96. Supra note 82 at 767.
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The Attorney General of Quebec saw the extension of freedom of expression
to include commercial expression as problematic for multiple reasons. 97 First,
he argued that since freedom of expression was listed under “fundamental”
freedoms in the Charter, it only protected fundamental forms of expression,
but commercial expression was not considered fundamental. He also criticized
the Court’s interpretation of freedom of expression for recognizing a de facto
economic right that the framers of the Charter did not intend. Furthermore, the
Attorney General of Quebec contended that there were no grounds to extend
constitutional protection to commercial advertising in particular, since its main
goal is to condition economic choices rather than to inform them. Finally, he
argued that the American experience has shown that even a limited recognition
of the right to commercial expression requires policy evaluation, which is a
prerogative of the parliament, not of the courts.
In Ford, the real test was in deciding whether Bill 101’s violation of section
2(b) of the Charter constituted a reasonable limit in accordance with section
1. Following the Oakes test, the Court agreed that Bill 101’s stated objective
to protect the quality and influence of the French language was serious and
legitimate due to the language’s endangered status in the province:
The causal factors for the threatened position of the French language that have generally been identified are: (a) the declining birth rate of Quebec francophones resulting in a decline in the Quebec francophone proportion of the Canadian population
as a whole; (b) the decline of the francophone population outside Quebec as a result
of assimilation; (c) the greater rate of assimilation of immigrants to Quebec by the
anglophone community of Quebec; and (d) the continuing dominance of English
at the higher levels of the economic sector. These factors have favoured the use of
the English language despite the predominance in Quebec of a francophone population. Thus, in the period prior to the enactment of the legislation at issue, the
“visage linguistique” of Quebec often gave the impression that English had become
as significant as French. This “visage linguistique” reinforced the concern among
francophones that English was gaining in importance, that the French language was
threatened and that it would ultimately disappear. It strongly suggested to young
and ambitious francophones that the language of success was almost exclusively
English. It confirmed to anglophones that there was no great need to learn the
majority language. And it suggested to immigrants that the prudent course lay in
joining the anglophone community.98

The Court also recognized that taking measures such as signage regulations to
protect Quebec’s visage linguistique (linguistic face) were necessary to ensure the
97. Ibid at 762-63.
98. Ford, supra note 82 at 778 [emphasis in original].
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predominance of the French language in the province. However, it determined
that the exclusive use of French in commercial advertising was neither a necessary
nor a proportionate means to achieve the law’s objective. The Court explained that
the Quebec government could have made the use of other languages conditional
on the presence of French or required that French be accorded greater visibility
than other languages.
While the blanket override provision in Bill 62 had already expired when
the Ford and Devine cases reached the Court,99 the one contained in Bill 57 had
not. After ruling on the validity of the standard override provision in Bill 57, the
Court held that sections 52 and 58 of Bill 101 were saved but not sections 57,
59-61 and 69, to which the override did not apply. But the Court nevertheless
invalidated all these provisions because it found that they infringed the freedom
of expression guaranteed by section 3 of Quebec’s Charter of human rights and
freedoms100 (Quebec Charter). Ford and Devine thus suggest that the Quebec
Charter, without having a formal constitutional status, could prevent Quebec
from protecting its common language and collective culture due to the individualistic nature of some of its rights provisions.
While Ford and Devine signified an advancement of the individual freedom
of expression for all Quebeckers, in reality they mostly benefitted the Anglophone
minority, whose members brought the cases before the Court.101 Although the
judgments reduced the strength of Bill 101, they cannot be said to have shown
a total disregard for its cultural objective.102 In a fine act of rights-balancing,
the Court was able simultaneously to uphold Quebec’s self-government right
to protect its visage linguistique and the Anglo-Quebecker community’s groupdifferentiated right to function in its own language in its everyday life. However,
the rights compromise reached by the Court did not fare well among nationalist
French-Quebeckers, and even outraged many of them.103
99. Even though the blanket override contained in Bill 62 was expired, the Court in Ford
pronounced on the validity of its application in conformity with s 33 of the Charter. It was
decided that, in general, s 33 allows only for prospective derogation and not for retrospective
derogation of rights protected by the Charter. See Ford, supra note 82 at 744-45.
100. CQLR c C12, s 3 [Quebec Charter].
101. See e.g. Claude Jean Galipeau, “National Minorities, Rights and Signs: The Supreme
Court and Language Legislation in Quebec” in Alain G Gagnon & A Brian Tanguay, eds,
Democracy with Justice: Essays in Honour of Khayyam Zev Paltiel (Ottawa: Carleton University
Press, 1992) 66.
102. David R Cameron & D Krikorian Jacqueline, “Recognizing Quebec in the Constitution of
Canada: Using the Bilateral Constitutional Amendment Process” (2008) 58:4 UTLJ 389.
103. Peter H Russell, Constitutional Odyssey: Can Canadians Become a Sovereign People?, 3d ed
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004) at 145 [Russell, Constitutional Odyssey].
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In response to Ford and Devine, Robert Bourassa, then Premier of Quebec,
passed Bill 178.104 This piece of legislation, referred to as the “inside-outside” law,
allowed for bilingual advertisement inside commercial establishments, with the
French language preserving a marked predominance, but required the exclusive
use of French on all exterior commercial signs. Because the new law contradicted
the verdicts given in Ford and Devine, the government of Quebec made use of
the notwithstanding clause found in both the federal and provincial Charters. By
enacting Bill 178, the Quebec government affirmed its self-government right in
language policy matters. Although the Anglophone minority had made minor
gains under Bill 178, the minority saw the law as a setback in terms of the rights
the Court had granted to it. Ironically, the use of the legislative override backfired
and created an uproar in the rest of Canada. It also led to the demise of the
Meech Lake Accord, which would have recognized Quebec as a “distinct society,”
and eventually put an end to the weakening of its language policy through constitutional litigation.105
Before the five-year derogation period expired, the Quebec National
Assembly passed Bill 86,106 which conformed to the Ford and Devine decisions by
allowing bilingual interior and exterior commercial signs with a marked predominance of French.107 Bill 86 also amended Bill 101 to recognize the Canada clause
officially, irrespective of the quality of francophone minority instruction services
in other Canadian provinces.108 The amendment also extended the “major part”
requirement to rights-holders under section 23(2) of the Charter by providing
that “a child whose father or mother is a Canadian citizen and who has received
or is receiving elementary or secondary instruction in English in Canada, and
the brothers and sisters of that child,” are eligible for publicly funded English
schooling, “provided that that instruction constitutes the major part of the
elementary or secondary instruction received by the child in Canada.”109 By
not requiring that the “totality” of the education be received in the minority
language, Quebec’s articulation of the “continuity of education” clause in the
Charter widened the criteria of eligibility for public English instruction. Although
aware of the risk of subterfuge, the government thought it unlikely that this
modification would lead wealthy Francophone or Allophone Quebeckers to send
104. Supra note 87.
105. See e.g. Patrick J Monahan, Meech Lake: The Inside Story (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 1991).
106. Supra note 40.
107. Ibid, s 18, amending Bill 101, supra note 30, s 58.
108. Bill 86, supra note 40, s 24, amending Bill 101, supra note 30, s 73(1).
109. Bill 86, supra note 40, s 24, amending Bill 101, supra note 30, s 73(2).
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their children to an English school in nearby Ontario for the first year of their
primary school in order to acquire an automatic right to publicly funded English
instruction in Quebec.110
These policy amendments to Bill 101 showed that Quebeckers’ mindset was
changing and that a certain linguistic peace in the province was possible through
compromise.111 Even though the Quebec government had to make concessions
to members of the Anglophone community, it retained the power to integrate
immigrants into the public French culture, thereby ensuring the culture’s preservation in the long term. In this sense, Quebec was able to continue to pursue its
ideal of a multinational Canadian citizenship, albeit with reduced means.

III. RECENT LANGUAGE RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE: THE
LEGAL ARMISTICE CHALLENGED
After more than a decade of legal armistice on Quebec’s language front, Bill 101
was once again challenged under the Charter. This time, however, it was not
challenged by Quebec’s historical Anglophone community but by individual
members of the Francophone112 and Allophone communities.113 As will be
discussed, these challenges have undermined Quebec’s self-government rights
and resulted in a more undifferentiated Canadian citizenship.
A.

GOSSELIN V QUEBEC (2005)

In Gosselin, section 73 of Bill 101 once again came under attack. This time,
Francophone parents114 who did not qualify as rights-holders under section 23 of
the Charter claimed that section 73 discriminated against the majority of Frenchspeaking children by refusing them access to publicly funded English instruction
and by denying a general freedom of choice with regard to language of instruction
in Quebec. The appellants contended that Bill 101 violated the equality rights
protected in the Quebec Charter. Although the Court dismissed the appeal under
the Quebec Charter, it deemed it necessary to assess whether such a challenge
110. Quebec, National Assembly, Journal des débats, 34th Leg, 2nd Sess, No 26 (20 May 1993) at
957-80 (Claude Ryan).
111. José Woehrling, “La Charte de la langue française: les ajustements juridiques” in Michel
Plourde & Pierre Georgeault, eds, Le français au Québec: 400 ans d’histoire et de vie
(Saint-Laurent, Que: Fides, 2008) 354.
112. Gosselin, supra note 7; Solski, supra note 8.
113. Solski, supra note 8; Nguyen, supra note 9.
114. Out of the sixteen appellants in Gosselin, only two were not born in Quebec and did not
receive their primary education in French. See Gosselin, supra note 7 at para 3.

RICHEZ, LOSING RELEVANCE 211

should also be dismissed under the federal Charter. In a unanimous decision, the
Court held that Bill 101 did not infringe the equality rights protected in section
15 of the Charter.
Even though “maternal language” had been recognized as an analogous
ground for discrimination under section 15 of the Charter by the Quebec
Superior Court in R c Entreprises WFH Ltée,115 the Court considered that what
was at stake in Gosselin was not the content of section 15 but rather its relationship with the positive language guarantees given to minorities in section 23
of the Charter and section 73 of Bill 101. Similar to its decision in Mahe v
Alberta,116 the Court found that universal individual rights such as those found
in section 15 of the Charter could not be invoked to nullify the special status
given to the English and French groups protected by sections such as section
23. Furthermore, as in Arsenault-Cameron v Prince Edward Island, 117 the Court
found that special treatment given to linguistic minorities pursuant to section 23
was not an exception to section 15, as it was not a violation of equality, but rather
the application of substantive equality. The Court thus established that there is
no hierarchy among constitutional rights and that the text of the Charter must
be understood comprehensively.
The Court also held that the Charter’s framers did not intend the principle of
freedom of choice with regard to language of instruction to be recognized within
the ambit of section 23. The framers were concerned that giving members of
the linguistic majority access to minority language schooling, especially outside
Quebec, would transform minority language schools into “centres of assimilation,” where members of the majority would outnumber members of the
minority.118 In the Quebec context, the framers were additionally worried that
such a policy would “operate to undermine the desire of the majority to protect
and enhance French as the majority language in Quebec, knowing that it will
remain the minority language in the broader context of Canada as a whole.”119
Since section 73 of Bill 101, as amended in 1993, was the legislative articulation
of the constitutional right found in section 23 of the Charter, the Court argued
that it could not conflict with section 15 of the Charter.
Gosselin resulted in the preservation of the legislative status quo. Graham
Fraser believes that the case demonstrates that the Charter is sensitive both to
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

[2001] RJQ 2557 (available on CanLII).
[1990] 1 SCR 342, 68 DLR (4th) 69 [Mahe cited to SCR].
2000 SCC 1, [2000] 1 SCR 3 [Arsenault-Cameron].
Gosselin, supra note 7 at para 31.
Ibid.
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Quebec’s desire to retain control over its education policy and to the right of
linguistic minorities to thrive.120 However, the Court justified its decision mainly
on the basis that the impugned provision of Bill 101 directly protected the groupdifferentiated rights of the members of the Anglophone community in Quebec
and indirectly protected the group-differentiated rights of the members of
Francophone communities outside Quebec, rather than the National Assembly’s
self-government right. While the Gosselin ruling went in favour of Quebec, one
may ask whether the parallel jurisprudential treatment of Francophone and
Anglophone linguistic minorities in Canada can undermine the vitality of French
in Quebec in other instances.
B. SOLSKI V QUEBEC (2005)

Members of the linguistic French majority and of the Allophone community
were more successful in challenging Bill 101 under the Charter in Solski. At issue
was the constitutionality of section 73(2) of Bill 101, which specifies that only
children who have completed the “major part” of their education in English
should have access to publicly funded education in English.121 In the appellants’
view, this provision violated section 23(2) of the Charter, which provides that
“[c]itizens of Canada of whom any child has received or is receiving primary or
secondary school instruction in English or French in Canada, have the right to
have all their children receive primary and secondary school instruction in the
same language.”122 In a unanimous decision, the Court concluded that section
73(2) of Bill 101, when properly interpreted, did not infringe the rights protected
in section 23(2) of the Charter and determined that the appellants qualified for
instruction in a publicly funded English school.
To determine whether a child had completed the “major part” of his or her
education in English, the Quebec government simply calculated whether the
child had spent more time in the English school system than in the French one.
The authorities also applied the “major part” criterion disjunctively, considering
the time spent at the elementary level separately from the time spent at the
secondary level. In the Court’s view, this strictly mathematical interpretation
of the “major part” requirement was incompatible with the purpose of section
23(2) of the Charter. The Court stated that the framers of the Charter intended
120. “Canadian Language Rights: Liberties, Claims, and the National Conversation” in James
B Kelly & Christopher P Manfredi, eds, Contested Constitutionalism: Reflections on the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2009) 169.
121. Supra note 30, s 73(2).
122. Supra note 1, s 23(2).
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this guarantee to “provide continuity of minority language education rights, to
accommodate mobility and to ensure family unity.”123 Indeed, section 23(2) does
not specify the time that a child must spend in a minority language school system
in order to benefit from the constitutional guarantee.
The Court found that section 23(2) requires that a child has a sufficient
connection with the language of the minority—in other words, the child needs
to have spent a “significant part” of his educational pathway in the language of
the minority.124 Furthermore, this connection must be assessed both subjectively
and objectively. The Quebec government would need to ask: “Subjectively, do the
circumstances show an intention to adopt the minority language as the language
of instruction? Objectively, do the educational experiences and choices to date
support such a connection?”125 The Court thus preferred a qualitative evaluation
of a student’s genuine commitment to minority language instruction that takes
into account “the time spent in each program, at what stage of education the
choice of language of instruction was made, what programs are or were available,
and whether learning disabilities or other difficulties exist.”126 Only by adopting
such an approach would section 73(2) of Bill 101 be considered constitutional.127
The Quebec government’s compliance with the “significant part” approach was
subsequently made official by regulation in 2010.128
Solski also tackled the question of whether immersion programs could be
equated with minority language education for the purpose of section 23(2) of
the Charter. The Quebec government had refused to give one of the appellants,
Shanning Casimir, access to publicly funded English schooling in Quebec because
she had attended a French immersion program in Ontario and was deemed not
to have received the majority of her education in English. The Court reversed
this decision, declaring that French immersion programs do not qualify as
Francophone minority education. Casimir was thus found to be more connected
to the Anglophone culture than to the Francophone culture:
Outside Quebec, immersion programs are designed to provide second language
training to children attending schools designed for those adopting the language of
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Solski, supra note 8 at para 30.
Ibid at para 46.
Ibid at para 40.
Ibid at para 33.
Contra Peter W Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 5th ed (Toronto: Carswell, 2007) at
56-30.
128. Regulation respecting the criteria and weighting used to consider instruction in English received in
a private educational institution not accredited for the purposes of subsidies, CQLR c C-11, r 2.1
[English Instruction Regulation].
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the majority. Immersion programs occur in a majority setting where the majority
language is spoken in the corridors and during extra-curricular activities. Immersion programs are run in majority schools that are a part of the majority school
system.129

The justices in Solski further specified that “[s]ection 23(2) in particular
facilitates mobility and continuity of education in the minority language, though
change of residence is not a condition for the exercise of the right.”130 Two of
the three appellant families whose children were deemed to qualify for publicly
funded English instruction had not moved from a Canadian province to Quebec.
The Solski family had moved from Poland to Quebec and had been granted
permission to send its children to publicly funded English schools on the basis
that the family’s stay in Quebec was to be temporary. The family later decided
to settle permanently in Quebec and sought permanent eligibility to send its
children to English public schools. In the case of the Lacroix family, one daughter
had completed her first two years of primary education in a private French school
but had opted to continue her education in an English private school.131
By adopting a broad and purposive approach to interpreting section 23(2),
the Court determined that this constitutional guarantee was not only for
members of the official linguistic minority as conventionally defined, but also
for members of the Allophone community and the linguistic majority. Thus,
the Solski Court was more concerned with the individual rights of all children
to have continuous education than with protecting Quebec’s self-government
right to promote French culture. Even before the decision in Solski was delivered,
however, the Quebec government had adopted An Act to amend the Charter of the
French language132 (Bill 104), under which the children of the Solski and Lacroix
families did not qualify for public English instruction. The constitutionality of
these amendments would later be assessed by the Court in Nguyen.
C.

NGUYEN V QUEBEC (2009)

Nguyen is the final case in a series of legal challenges aimed at vindicating
minority language education rights against Quebec’s legislative power. At issue
in Nguyen was the constitutionality of paragraphs 2 and 3 of section 73 of Bill
101, which concern eligibility to attend publicly subsidized English schools in
129.
130.
131.
132.

Solski, supra note 8 at para 50.
Ibid at para 33.
Ibid at paras 14, 16.
SQ 2002, c 28, amending Bill 101, supra note 30 [Bill 104].
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Quebec. Bill 104 added these provisions to Bill 101 to counter the effects of
so-called bridging schools: Parents whose children were not entitled to receive
publicly funded education in English under section 23(1) of the Charter would
enroll their children in unsubsidized English schools for a few weeks or months
for the purpose of acquiring an automatic right to publicly funded Englishlanguage education pursuant to section 23(2). This trend was increasing at
the turn of the present century, especially among members of the Allophone
community. Paragraph 2 of section 73 establishes that time spent in an unsubsidized English school shall not be taken into account when determining whether
a child, his siblings, or his descendants may have access to a publicly subsidized
English school.133 Paragraph 3 of section 73 applies the same rule to special cases
where the province has authorized the child to receive schooling in English due
to a serious learning disability, temporary residence in Quebec, or an exceptional
family or humanitarian situation.134 Due to the circumstantial character of these
exemptions, the Quebec government did not want the siblings and descendants
of children benefitting from them to have the constitutional right to attend
public English school.135
In a unanimous judgment, the Court decided that paragraphs 2 and 3 of
section 73 of Bill 101 infringed section 23(2) of the Charter. The Court pointed
out that this constitutional right does not specify whether the education received
has to be private or public nor does it mention the type of authorization by which
it must have been granted. On the contrary, the Court held that section 23(2)
alludes to the fact that a child has received instruction in one of Canada’s two
official languages. As Justice Lebel wrote for the Court: “The inability to assess
a child’s educational pathway in its entirety in determining the extent of his or
her educational language rights has the effect of truncating the child’s reality by
creating a fictitious educational pathway that cannot serve as a basis for a proper
application of the constitutional guarantees.”136
Solski had determined that eligibility for instruction in the language of the
minority was conditional on the child’s educational pathway being “genuine.”137
For the Nguyen Court, this meant that the evaluation of a child’s pathway must
be comprehensive but must also recognize cases in which attendance at a school
133. Bill 101, supra note 30, s 73(2).
134. Ibid, s 73(3), as repealed by An Act to amend the Charter of the French language and other
legislative provisions, SQ 2010, c 23, s 1.
135. Quebec, National Assembly, Journal des débats, 36th Leg, 2nd Sess, vol 37, No 42 (31 May
2002) (Diane Lemieux).
136. Nguyen, supra note 9 at para 33.
137. Supra note 8 at para 28.
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is used solely and artificially to acquire an educational minority language right.
The judges acknowledged that a literal interpretation of section 23(2) might lead
to a return to the principle of freedom of choice of the language of instruction
in Quebec, which they did not consider to be the intent of the Charter’s drafters.
Furthermore, the Court found that the impugned provisions of Bill 101 did
not withstand a section 1 analysis. While the objective of the law was found to
be pressing and substantial, the means chosen were found to be excessive under
the proportionality requirement of the Oakes test. In Ford, the Court had already
recognized the importance for Quebec of protecting the French language and
realized that bridging schools were compromising this objective. In Nguyen,
however, the Court determined that paragraphs 2 and 3 of section 73 of Bill 101
did not minimally impair the constitutional rights of the appellants. While the
number of children who became eligible for publicly funded English education
after having attended a privately funded English school was increasing, the
overall number remained low in proportion to the number of children enrolled
in the educational system. For that reason, Justice Lebel stated that “the absolute
prohibition on considering an educational pathway in [an unsubsidized private
school] seems overly drastic.”138 The Court concluded that, in reality, its decision
would not imply a return to freedom of choice, and that other solutions, such as
the contextual approach referred to in Solski, were available to Quebec’s National
Assembly to deal with the problem of bridging schools.
In addition, the Court found paragraph 3 to be incompatible with the
principle of preserving family unity provided for in section 23(2) of the Charter.
In the case at hand, one of the appellants was not able to secure eligibility for
instruction in English for his son even though his daughter was attending a
school in the publicly funded English system pursuant to a special authorization.
The Court recognized that by granting certain children special authorizations
to attend publicly funded English schools, the government was exceeding its
constitutional obligations, but held that once it did so, it could not then limit the
constitutional rights derived from such authorizations.
Just as in Solski, the right of eligibility for publicly funded English instruction
for certain categories of individuals was promoted in Nguyen to the detriment
of the self-government right of Quebec to protect the vitality of the French
language. While the Court was careful to recognize that a child’s educational
pathway must be genuine rather than artificial when determining eligibility for
instruction in the minority language, in reality, the invalidation of paragraph 2
of section 73 granted individuals the economic right to buy their children and
138. Nguyen, supra note 9 at para 42.
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subsequent generations a legal status as a member of one of Canada’s official
linguistic minority communities. Nguyen therefore undeniably increased the
possibility of language substitution to the benefit of the English language and
took from the Quebec government a policy tool that would have been helpful in
integrating newcomers into the French public culture.
Although some people, including the Leader of the Official Opposition,
Pauline Marois, urged the government to invoke the notwithstanding clause
in response to Nguyen, the government could not do so since the clause does
not apply to section 23 of the Charter. Having no other option, Quebec
was constrained to comply with the Court’s judgment. In 2010, the Quebec
government of Jean Charest consequently adopted An Act following upon the court
decisions on the language of instruction139 (Bill 115), which essentially complied
with the Solski and Nguyen decisions by allowing the government to determine,
by way of regulation, the analytic framework to be used in assessing eligibility
for publicly funded English schools. The implementing regulations require
consideration of time spent in an unsubsidized English school when assessing
students’ educational pathways.140 Although Bill 115 deems illegal the creation
or operation of an educational establishment for the purpose of circumventing
the principle of French instruction, the regulations provide that three years spent
in an unsubsidized English school are sufficient to guarantee access to publicly
funded English schools. In 2012, Parti Québécois leader Pauline Marois ran
her successful election campaign on the promise to put an end to the bridging
schools, but her government failed to propose legislation on the matter. This begs
the question of whether or not Quebec has exhausted its legislative counterattacks to unfavourable judicial decisions in the area of language rights.

IV. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT’S CHARTER-BASED REVIEW
OF BILL 101
An analysis of the Court’s Charter-based review of Bill 101 reveals that Quebec
is increasingly losing relevance in the constitutional politics of language. In all
its judgments, the Court unanimously secured the group-differentiated rights of
the Anglophone minority and, increasingly, the rights of individual Allophones
and Francophones, against the democratic will of the Quebec majority. Even
in Gosselin, the outcome of which favoured the Quebec government, the main
justification for the decision was the need to protect linguistic minorities rather
139. SQ 2010, c 23 [Bill 115].
140. English Instruction Regulation, supra note 128.
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than French-Quebeckers’ collective interest. This state of affairs can be attributed
to three factors: the move towards an implacable parallel constitutionalism, a
redefinition of official linguistic minority rights, and the exhaustion of legislative
counterattacks.
A. THE MOVE TOWARDS AN IMPLACABLE PARALLEL
CONSTITUTIONALISM

The Court’s preference for the group-differentiated rights of the AngloQuebeckers can be explained by the constitutional parallelism approach that
it has adopted with regard to the interpretation of minority language rights.141
This approach consists of treating linguistic minorities equally regardless of
their official spoken language. Section 23 of the Charter specifically refers to
the protection of provincial linguistic minorities—namely Francophones outside
Quebec and Anglophones in Quebec—not to the protection of French, which is
a minority language in Canada as a whole. The latter would warrant an asymmetrical treatment of linguistic minorities that, in practice, would entail protecting
the rights of Francophones outside Quebec and protecting the use of French in
Quebec, even at the expense of limiting the rights of other linguistic minorities
within that province. Although the legitimacy of constitutional parallelism can
be justified by the wording and structure of the linguistic rights provisions of the
Charter, the Court’s reliance on this principle as a method of interpretation has
become increasingly important. In interpreting minority language educational
rights, the Court appears to have been concerned mainly with the situation of
Francophones outside Quebec and how it might be affected by the jurisprudence
on Bill 101, rather than with the fate of French in Quebec. To better understand
the Court’s approach, it is necessary to read recent jurisprudence in conjunction
with other minority-language case law from outside Quebec, notably Abbey v
Essex County Board of Education142 and Whittington v Saanich Sch Dist 63.143
Abbey dealt with children living in Ontario who did not qualify for minority
language education under section 23(1) of the Charter. Their mother, Susan
Abbey, spoke English as her first language and had received her primary school
education in English. Her eldest son, Nicholas, had nonetheless attended a

141. See especially, Carolyn J Tuohy, Policy and Politics in Canada: Institutionalized Ambivalence
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992); Claude Ryan, “L’impact de la Charte
canadienne des droits et libertés sur les droits linguistiques au Québec” (2003) 63 R du B 543.
142. (1999), 42 OR (3d) 481; 169 DLR (4th) 451 [Abbey cited to OR].
143. (1987), 16 BCLR (2d) 255, 44 DLR (4th) 128 [Whittington cited to BCLR].
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French minority school pursuant to the decision of an admissions committee.144
Thanks to section 23(2) of the Charter, his siblings were also able to attend a
French minority school. When the family moved from London, Ontario to Essex
County, the local school board denied the children access to minority language
instruction on the basis that they did not originally qualify for it under section
23(1) of the Charter. The Ontario Court of Appeal found in favour of the Abbey
family, declaring that section 23(2) extends to parents who are not connected
linguistically or culturally to the linguistic minority group of their province of
residence. It also decided that the exercise of section 23(2) rights is not conditional
on interprovincial migration. As Justice Abella explained:
For purposes of s. 23(2), it does not matter whether this prior language instruction
originated in another province, another part of a province, or through the kind of
admissions committee contemplated by the Education Act. However it originated, it
is the fact of it having occurred which attracts the protection of s. 23(2).145

Justice Abella sympathized with Francophone minorities’ desire to grow
their ranks with individuals who may not initially have a cultural and linguistic
connection to them.146 She recognized that “[t]he more fluency there is in
Canada’s official languages, the more opportunity there is for minority language
groups to flourish in the community.”147 By confirming the Abbey approach in
Solski and Nguyen, albeit without explicitly referencing the decision, the Court
showed its preference for the well-being of provincial minorities over provincial
majorities. If it had ruled in favour of Quebec, it would have endangered the
future vitality of Francophone minorities outside Quebec.
Increasing enrolment in minority language schools can be highly beneficial
for Francophone minorities. It can help attain the numbers needed to extend the
right to minority language instruction to new areas pursuant to section 23(3) of
the Charter, and it can help to justify increased funding for existing educational
facilities.148 However, opening the doors of minority language schools to members
of the linguistic majority can turn these schools into assimilation centres. The
Court was therefore careful to strike a balance between increasing enrolment
144. Ontarian minority language schools may admit students that do not qualify under s 23 of
the Charter. See Education Act, RSO 1990, c E.2, s 289.
145. Abbey, supra note 142 at 488.
146. José Woehrling, “La contestation judiciaire de la politique linguistique du Québec en matière
de langue d’enseignement” (2005) 44 Revista de Llengua i Dret 101 at 122 [Woehrling,
“Contestation Judiciaire”].
147. Abbey, supra note 142 at 489.
148. Woehrling, “Contestation Judiciaire,” supra note 146 at 123.
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and preventing assimilation. In Gosselin, the main justification for disallowing
freedom of choice with regard to language of instruction in Quebec was the
need to protect linguistic minorities. The idea that members of the Quebec
Anglophone community would assimilate into the French majority if freedom
of choice were sanctioned is, however, questionable considering the assimilating force of the English language in North America. Indeed, before Bill 22,
when freedom of choice prevailed in Quebec, Anglophones were certainly not
assimilated. The Court’s concern for assimilation only makes sense in the context
of Francophones outside Quebec. In fact, its decision in Gosselin refers directly
to Abbey to support the argument that freedom of choice does not fall within the
ambit of section 23 of the Charter.149
Although the Court’s desire to prevent the assimilation of Francophone
minorities did not work to Quebec’s detriment in Gosselin, it did so in Solski. In
that case, the justices specified that French immersion programs do not qualify
as minority language education under section 23(2) of the Charter. By doing so,
they implicitly confirmed the decision in Whittington.150 In Whittington, parents
whose children had received education in a French immersion program claimed
the right to have all their children instructed in French-language minority schools.
In its decision, the Supreme Court of British Columbia stated that a French
immersion program cannot qualify as minority language education because “[i]
n that programme French is taught as a second language, recognizing English as
the primary or first language.”151 In Solski the Court corroborated this idea and
added that an important “cultural element”152 is involved in minority language
education, as it had affirmed in Mahe when it declared that “minority schools
themselves provide community centres where the promotion and preservation
of minority language culture can occur; they provide needed locations where
[members of ] the minority community can meet and facilities which they can
use to express their culture.”153 To recognized attendance in a French immersion
program as a ticket to French minority language education would jeopardize the
future cultural unity of Francophone minority schools. This reasoning resulted in
the widening of the eligibility criteria for Anglophone minority schools in cases
like that of Shanning Casimir, who had attended a French immersion school in
Ontario prior to moving to Quebec.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Supra note 7 at para 30.
Supra note 143.
Ibid at 266.
Solski, supra note 8 at para 50.
Supra note 116 at 363.
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The use of the limitation clause in section 1 of the Charter has been identified
as a way to transcend the symmetry associated with language rights by simultaneously supporting Francophone minorities outside of Quebec and promoting the
French language within Quebec;154 yet, constitutional parallelism has increasingly guided the Court’s section 1 analysis. In earlier jurisprudence, the necessity
of preserving Quebec’s French culture was recognized under the limitation
clause. In Ford, the requirement of unilingual French public signs could not be
saved under section 1, but the justices allowed for the predominance of French
in public signage due to Quebec’s particular linguistic situation.155 It is unlikely
that such a decision would have been rendered outside Quebec, as there is simply
no substantial and pressing need to mandate the use of English in public signage
in other provinces.
In its more recent jurisprudence, the Court has recognized the need for a
certain asymmetrical treatment of language rights, but to no avail. The Court
established in Solski that, despite its uniform approach to linguistic rights, the
socio-historical context of each province had to be taken into account when
implementing those rights under section 1.156 However, since the Court upheld
the constitutionality of Bill 101 by reading down section 73(2), it avoided
subjecting Quebec’s mathematical approach to the “major part” requirement
to a section 1 analysis. This prevented Quebec from using the opportunity to
justify a limitation of rights guaranteed by section 23(2) of the Charter. Finally,
in Nguyen, the Court could have shown more concern for Quebec’s unique
context under section 1. The worrisome phenomenon of “bridging schools” has
not been witnessed in the rest of Canada. Ultimately, the justices did not save the
impugned provisions of Bill 104 under section 1, even though there was interpretative space for such a constitutional reading; the proportionality requirement of
the Oakes test seems to have been fatal to Quebec’s claim of reasonably limiting
language rights in this case.

154. Michel Bastarache, “Asymmetrical Federalism and Official Languages” (Paper delivered at
the McLachlin Court’s First Decade: Reflections on the Past and Projections for the Future,
Canadian Bar Association Conference, 19 June 2009), online: <http://www.cba.org/cba/cle/
PDF/Constit09_Bastarache_paper.pdf>; Woehrling, “Contestation Judiciaire,” supra note
146.
155. Supra note 82 at 777-80.
156. Supra note 8 at para 21.
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B. A REDEFINITION OF OFFICIAL LINGUISTIC MINORITY RIGHTS

Official minority linguistic rights have been significantly redefined since the
enactment of the Charter, to the detriment of Quebec. More specifically, the
Court’s jurisprudence has made way for the individualization of the education
rights found in section 23 of the Charter. Originally, minority-language education
rights were constitutionally enshrined to protect Canada’s historic linguistic
minorities.157 Although former Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau had a clear
preference for the adoption of the individual freedom of choice in education, he
soon realized that it would not rally support in Quebec. Quebec was worried,
for economic reasons, that such a principle would encourage members of the
Francophone majority and Allophone minority to choose to have their children
educated in English. Trudeau consequently opted for the protection of official
language minority group rights, which was supported by the Liberal Party of
Quebec. Trudeau’s intention was made clear in a governmental statement
explaining the nature of minority-language education rights in the 1980 constitutional package:
This constitutional right to choose would not apply to non-citizens, or to citizens
who belong to the official language majority population of the province. Thus a
province would remain free to place the children of immigrants in the majority
language school system of the province and to require children who are members of
the language majority of that province to receive their education in that language.158

As previously mentioned, Quebec was exempted from the application of the
mother tongue clause in section 23(1)(a) of the Charter in order to protect its
capacity to channel students into the French education system. The application
of section 23 of the Charter in Quebec therefore principally targeted the historic
Quebec Anglophone community. Most of the children who had a guaranteed
right to publicly funded English instruction were those whose parents had received
English instruction in Quebec and thus had strong roots in the historic Quebec
Anglophone community. Section 23(1)(b) also gave access to publicly funded
English schools to those children whose parents had received English instruction
in the rest of Canada. Although the latter group would have weaker roots in the
historic Anglophone community, it would have strong roots in the Canadian
Anglophone community. Its integration in Quebec’s historic Anglophone
community would be organic given the natural tie that binds the English157. Proulx, supra note 56 at 146.
158. The Canadian Constitution 1980: Explanation of a proposed Resolution respecting the
Constitution of Canada (Ottawa: Publications Canada, 1980) at 15.
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speaking community outside Quebec to Anglophone Quebeckers. Children
without strong roots in the Quebec or Canadian Anglophone community could
exceptionally gain access to publicly funded English instruction via section
23(2). This provision’s initial draft, however, made continuity of education for
linguistic minorities conditional on interprovincial migration.159 It provided that
Allophone or Francophone students who had attended English schools outside
Quebec could subsequently attend publicly funded English schools in Quebec;
but this provision did not apply to children who had spent time in Quebec’s
private English education system. Therefore, the integration of children into
Quebec’s historic Anglophone community pursuant to section 23(2) would also
be organic, rather than deliberate and artificial.
The condition of interprovincial migration in section 23(2) was, however,
removed from the final constitutional package of 1982, at the request of Liberal
Senator Pietro Rizzuto and the National Congress of Italian-Canadians.160 As
enacted, the provision states that “[c]itizens of Canada of whom any child has
received or is receiving primary or secondary school instruction in English or
French in Canada, have the right to have all their children receive primary and
secondary school instruction in the same language.”161 In demanding this change,
the Italian community was pursuing two objectives.162 First, it wanted to constitutionalize the acquired rights of Allophones in Quebec.163 Paragraphs c and d of
section 73 of Bill 101 allowed Allophones who were enrolled in an English school
at the time of the passage of Bill 101 to maintain their enrolment, regardless of
whether their parents had received English instruction in Quebec.164 Second, the
Italian community wanted to normalize the situation of approximately 1,500
159. The Canadian Constitution 1980: Proposed Resolution respecting the Constitution of Canada
(Ottawa: Publications Canada, 1980) at 22. Section 23(2) of the Proposed Resolution
respecting the Constitution of Canada reads as follows:
Where a citizen of Canada changes residence from one province to another and, prior to the
change, any child of that citizen has been receiving his or her primary or secondary school
instruction in either English or French, that citizen has the right to have any or all of his or
her children receive their primary and secondary school instruction in that same language if
the number of children of citizens resident in the area of the province to which the citizen has
moved, who have a right recognized by this section, is sufficient to warrant the provision out
of public funds of minority language educational facilities in that area. Redefinition of Official
Linguistic Minority Rights

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Proulx, supra note 56 at 155.
Charter, supra note 1, s 23(2).
Proulx, supra note 56 at 155-57.
Ibid at 155.
Supra note 30, ss 73(c)-(d), as re-enacted by Bill 86, supra note 40, s 24.
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students, mostly of Italian origin, who were receiving public English instruction
in Quebec illegally since the enactment of Bill 101.165 Ironically, the modification of section 23(2) demanded by the Italian community was never able to
solve the problem of illegal instruction in Quebec.166 This problem was addressed
separately in 1986 with the adoption of An Act respecting the eligibility of certain
children for instruction in English167 (Bill 58).
As rewritten, section 23(2) opened the door for children to acquire a constitutional right to attend public minority language schools after having spent a
certain period of time in an unsubsidized private minority language school,
thereby legalizing the concept of “bridging schools.”168 No available documentation, however, shows that the Charter drafters and the Italian community
considered this legal stratagem at the time.169 While the goal of the change was
to ensure the constitutional protection of the acquired rights of Allophones
in Quebec,170 the seeds of the present individualization of minority-language
education rights had been planted.
Although the rights conferred by section 23 of the Charter are couched
in individualist terms,171 they were initially given a collective meaning in the
jurisprudence. In Mahe, the Court determined that section 23 had two general
underlying goals: first, the preservation and development of the cultures of official
language minorities, and second, the correction of past injustices endured by
official language minorities.172 As Chief Justice Dickson wrote, “Section 23 confers
upon a group a right which places positive obligations on government to alter or
develop major institutional structures.”173 The constitutional objective pursued
by minority-language education rights informed both subsequent Supreme
Court of Canada decisions beyond Quebec’s section 23(1) jurisprudence174 and

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Proulx, supra note 56 at 156.
Ibid.
SQ 1986, c 46 [Bill 58].
Proulx, supra note 56 at 156.
Ibid.
Ibid at 156-57.
See Monahan, Politics, supra note 3 at 112. The exception to this assessment is s 23(3)(b),
which posits that the rights contained in ss 23(1)-(2) apply only “where the number[s] … so
warrants,” meaning that minority language education services will only be provided where
there exists a significant minority language community. See Charter, supra note 1, s 23(3)(b).
172. Supra note 116.
173. Ibid at 365 [emphasis added].
174. Reference Re Public Schools Act (Man), s 79(3), (4) and (7), [1993] 1 SCR 839, 100 DLR
(4th) 723 [Public Schools Act (Man) cited to SCR]; Arsenault-Cameron, supra note 117.
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the decisions of lower courts beyond Quebec’s section 23(2) jurisprudence.175
Quebec had no problem guaranteeing its historic Anglophone community
collective group rights. Section 23 extended to Francophones outside Quebec
rights somewhat similar to those Anglo-Quebeckers already enjoyed under Bill
101. However, the recognition in Solski and Nguyen of purely individual rights
under section 23 was seen by Quebec as more problematic.
In Solski, the Court changed its interpretation of section 23 rights by
asserting that they were primarily individualistic in nature:
Section 23 is clearly meant to protect and preserve both official languages and the
cultures they embrace throughout Canada; its application will of necessity affect
the future of minority language communities. Section 23 rights are in that sense
collective rights. The conditions for their application reflect this (Doucet-Boudreau,
at para. 28): implementation depends on numbers of qualified pupils (Mahe, at pp.
366-67; Reference re Public Schools Act (Man.), at p. 850; Arsenault-Cameron, at para.
32). Nevertheless, these rights are not primarily described as collective rights, even
though they presuppose that a language community is present to benefit from their
exercise. A close attention to the formulation of s. 23 reveals individual rights in
favour of persons belonging to specific categories of rights holders.176

In this passage, the Court limited the collective aspect of section 23 to
subsection (3), which deals with the number of minority language students
needed to warrant the establishment of minority language education infrastructure. The characterization of subsections 23(1) and (2) as strictly individualistic
is a new phenomenon.177 The reasons given in Solski and Nguyen in favour of the
right of Allophone and Francophone Quebeckers to instruction in the language
of the minority differed greatly, in some circumstances, from those given earlier
to defend the same right for Francophones outside Quebec. In Solski, the Court
asserted that the reason for the “continuity of language instruction” clause
found in section 23(2) was to reward an individual’s “genuine commitment to
a minority language education,”178 rather than to protect the Anglo-Quebecker
175. Abbey, supra note 142.
176. Supra note 8 at para 23 [emphasis added].
177. Contra Gruben, supra note 51 at 117-19. Nicolas M Rouleau believes that Solski depicts
ss 23(1)-(2) as simultaneously individual and collective: “The right [in s 23] is ‘individual’
because it allows individual members of the minority to fulfil their personal aspirations
within the context of their own language. The right is ‘collective’ because it intends to
promote the development of minority-language communities throughout Canada … .” See
Nicolas M Rouleau, “Section 23 of the Charter: Minority-Language Education Rights” in
Joseph Eliot Magnet, Official Languages of Canada: New Essays (Markham, Ont: LexisNexis
Canada, 2008) 261 at 292-93 [footnotes omitted].
178. Supra note 8 at para 28.

226

(2014) 52 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

community.179 Furthermore, granting eligibility for publicly funded English
instruction to children of Allophones and Francophones in Quebec does not
counter the assimilation of the Anglo-Quebecker community nor does it redress
past linguistic injustices, except for not being able to recruit new members.
Rather, it precludes Quebec from using a powerful policy tool for the survival of
its French public culture.
C. THE EXHAUSTION OF LEGISLATIVE COUNTERATTACKS

Since the enactment of the Charter, Quebec’s National Assembly has been
increasingly unsuccessful at counteracting the effects of the Court’s jurisprudence
on Bill 101 in order to protect and promote the French language in Quebec. To
start, Quebec has not been able to rely on the notwithstanding clause. Because
the provincial language policy was predominantly challenged under section 23,
the establishment of a rights violation by the judiciary could not be overturned
constitutionally via the notwithstanding clause. In Ford, the only case in which
the notwithstanding clause was available, its use was found to be politically
unviable in the long run. The unavailability of the notwithstanding clause has
forced the Quebec government to show legislative ingenuity in its pursuit of
linguistic goals, especially in the area of education.
As soon as the Canada clause was adopted in 1982, the Quebec government
understood that the Quebec clause would not withstand a constitutional
challenge. Even before the Quebec clause was struck down in Quebec Protestant
School Boards, the government of René Lévesque made the application of the
Canada clause conditional on the implementation of minority language education
infrastructure in other provinces.180 If the government was not able to safeguard
the Quebec clause, it wished to promote the vitality of French in other parts of the
country. Eventually, the Court invalidated this controversial Bill 101 provision,
which in any event lacked cross-party consensus in the National Assembly. This
legal defeat was somewhat easy for the Parti Québécois to swallow, as Quebec
maintained the capacity to successfully integrate Allophones into French public
culture.
The successive addition of the “major part” requirement to sections 73(1)181
and 73(2)182 of Bill 101 also helped Quebec in its quest to francize Allophones.
179. Henri Brun, “La Cour suprême du Canada et le droit à l’école publique anglaise au Québec”
(2006) 1 Bull québécois de droit constitutionnel 18 at 21; Brouillet, supra note 43 at 378.
180. Bill 101, supra note 30, s 86.1.
181. Ibid, s 73(1).
182. Ibid, s 73(2).
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Although it was initially adopted with a view to widening the eligibility criteria
for publicly funded English schools for Anglophones, it also had the effect of
guaranteeing that those eligible for publicly funded English schools would have
a sufficient connection to the English minority, whether through their own
education or that of their siblings or parents. Although this legal measure was
read down in Solski with the imposition of the “significant part” requirement,
Quebec’s goal of preventing members of the Francophone majority and
Allophone minority from artificially gaining access to publicly funded English
schools was maintained. Thanks to the earlier introduction of Bill 104, time
spent in an unsubsidized English school would not be taken into account when
determining eligibility for publicly funded English schools. Bill 104 also provided
that both the time spent at the elementary level and the secondary level would be
considered when applying the “major part” requirement.
When the Court in Nguyen invalidated the new measures introduced by Bill
104, it removed an important policy tool for the Quebec government to ensure
the integration of newcomers into French public culture. Quebec’s Ministry of
Education, Recreation and Sport revealed that the number of children eligible for
publicly funded English education on the basis of their attendance at an unsubsidized English school increased from 628 in 1998 to 1379 in 2002.183 According
to demographer Robert Maheu’s conservative estimate, this number would have
reached 11,000 in 2009, which amounts to 10 per cent of the total population
of public English schools in Quebec.184 These figures are more worrisome than
those to which the Court referred in Nguyen.185 Although Bill 115 prohibits
bridging schools, it nevertheless allows members of the Francophone majority
and Allophone minority to buy their children and their descendants a right to
183. Robert Maheu, Address (Lecture delivered at Table ronde 2009: Le jugement de la Cour
suprême sur la loi 104, 11 November 2009), online: The Institute for Research on French in
America <http://irfa.ca/table2009_1.html>.
184. Ibid.
185. Supra note 9 at para 42. In Nguyen, LeBel J stated that:
For example, in the 20012 school year, according to statistics provided by the Ministère de
l’Éducation for the entire province of Quebec, just over 2,100 students enrolled in Englishlanguage UPSs at the preschool, elementary and secondary levels throughout Quebec did not
have certificates of eligibility for instruction in English (A.R., at p. 1605). Thus, before Bill 104
came into force, the time they spent in these institutions could have qualified them for a
transfer to the publicly-funded Englishlanguage system. This represents just over 1.5 percent of
the total number of students eligible for instruction in English that year (Rapport sur l’évolution
de la situation linguistique au Québec, 20022007, at p. 82). This number has since increased.
The number of students attending Englishlanguage UPSs who did not have certificates of
eligibility exceeded 4,000 in the 20078 school year (A.R., at p. 1605).
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publicly funded English schooling. This constitutional loophole will undeniably
increase language substitution to the benefit of the English language in Quebec,
especially among members of the Allophone minority, who run the risk of
cutting all significant contact with the French language.186 For most Allophones
living in the Montreal metropolitan area, where English continues to be a greater
assimilating force than French,187 integration into the majority public culture is
inextricably linked to their (or their children’s) enrolment in French institutions.188
The analytical framework introduced in 2010 to determine eligibility
to attend publicly funded English schools is likely to be legally challenged in
the future.189 The requirement of at least three years’ attendance at an unsubsidized English school in order to gain access to a publicly funded English school

186. For a different view, see James B Kelly, “Les limites de la mobilisation judiciaire: Alliance
Québec, la Charte de la langue française et la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés” in
François Rocher & Benoît Pelletier, eds, Le nouvel ordre constitutionnel canadien: du
rapatriement de 1982 à nos jours (Quebec: Presses de l’Université du Québec, 2013) 205
at 227-30. Kelly argues that the 2010 regulations have made eligibility for public English
instruction, after a stay in the English private system, more restrictive because of the extensive
costs associated with attending private English school for three years and the discretionary
nature of the eligibility granting process.
187. Groupe de travail ministériel pour un plan d’action en vue de promouvoir et de maintenir
le caractère français de Montréal et d’assurer la vitalité et la qualité de la langue française au
Québec, “Les défis de la langue française à Montréal et au Québec au XXIe siècle: constats
et enjeux” (2000), online: Secrétariat à la politique linguistique <http://www.spl.gouv.qc.ca/
documentation/rapportssondagesstatistiques/lesdefisdelalangue/>.
188. See e.g. Marie Mc Andrew, “La loi 101 en milieu scolaire: impacts et résultats” in Pierre
Bouchard & Richard Y Bourhis, eds, L’aménagement linguistique au Québec: 25 ans
d’application de la Charte de la langue française, Revue d’aménagement linguistique (Quebec:
Publications du Québec, 2002) 69; Isabelle Beaulieu, “Le premier portrait des enfants de la
loi 101” in Michel Venne, ed, L’annuaire du Québec 2004 (Anjou, Que: Fides, 2003) 260;
Alain Carpentier, “Tout est-il joué avant l’arrivée? Étude de facteurs associés à un usage
prédominant du français ou de l’anglais chez les immigrants allophones arrivés au Québec
adultes” (2004) at 42, online: Conseil supérieur de la langue française <http://www.cslf.gouv.
qc.ca/publications/pubf204/f204.pdf>.
189. See Dean Ardron, “Amendments to the Quebec Charter of the French Language
Constitutionally Invalid,” Case Comment on Nguyen v Quebec (Education, Recreation and
Sport), (2010) 19:3 Educ & LJ 247; Guy Régimbald & Dwight Newman, The Law of the
Canadian Constitution (Markham, Ont: LexisNexis Canada, 2013) at 709-10.
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may be judicially reduced to a shorter period.190 Under these circumstances,
what legislative remedies are still available to Quebec to stop the expected turn
towards an indirect freedom of choice in education? Two main solutions have
been put forward to overcome this legal deadlock. First, some have argued that
the application of Bill 101 should be extended to unsubsidized schools.191 In
practice, this would mean that only those who qualify for minority language
education under section 23 of the Charter would have the right to attend unsubsidized English schools in Quebec. Such a measure could easily be challenged in
court on the basis that it violates the spirit of the minority-language education
rights provision. The courts could rule that section 23 applies only to publicly
funded schools. If Bill 101 is to be a legislative articulation of this constitutional
provision, however, it may not limit access to privately funded schools.
The second proposed solution is to amend the Constitution Act, 1982,
through the bilateral amendment procedure in section 43,192 either to recognize
explicitly that time spent in an unsubsidized English school in Quebec will not

190. The minimum would likely not fall under one year. In Nguyen, LeBel J declared that:
[I]t might be thought that an educational pathway of six months or one year spent at the start
of elementary school in an institution established to serve as a bridge to the public education
system would not be consistent with the purposes of s. 23(2) of the Canadian Charter and the
interpretation given to that provision in Solski.

See supra note 9 at para 44.
191. Woehrling, “Contestation Judiciaire,” supra note 121; Maheu, supra note 157; Daniel Proulx
& Jean-Pierre Proulx, “Jugement sur la loi 104 - Imposer la loi 101 aux écoles privées non
subventionnées,” Le Devoir (11 November 2009) online: <http://www.ledevoir.com/societe/
education/274476/jugement-sur-la-loi-104-imposer-la-loi-101-aux-ecoles-privees-nonsubventionnees>; “Avis sur l’accès à l’école anglaise à la suite du jugement de la Cour suprême
du 22 octobre 2009” Conseil supérieur de la langue française (2010) at 40-42, online: <http://
www.cslf.gouv.qc.ca/publications/avis204/a204.pdf>.
192. Supra note 53, s 43. Section 43 reads as follows:
An amendment to the Constitution of Canada in relation to any provision that applies to one
or more, but not all, provinces, including
(a) any alteration to boundaries between provinces, and
(b) any amendment to any provision that relates to the use of the English or the French
language within a province,
may be made by proclamation issued by the Governor General under the Great Seal of Canada
only where so authorized by resolutions of the Senate and House of Commons and of the
legislative assembly of each province to which the amendment applies.
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open the door to public English schools,193 or to enshrine an interpretative clause
that recognizes Quebec’s distinctiveness,194 similar to the clauses proposed in the
Meech Lake and Charlottetown Accords. Such a clause could protect Bill 101
from future attacks. It is unlikely, however, that the federal government would
support such an amendment, considering the history of constitutional negotiations in Canada. In that sense, Quebec appears to have exhausted its available
legislative responses to effectively counteract the Court’s Charter jurisprudence.
By repeatedly being forced to comply with the Court’s judgments, Quebec
has had to accept the protection of group-differentiated rights and, in some
cases, purely individual rights, to the detriment of its self-government rights. Put
simply, since the coming into force of the Charter, Quebec has not been able to
stop the move towards an undifferentiated Canadian citizenship.

V. CONCLUSION
By determining the content of linguistic rights, the courts, rather than
governments, have become central in defining Canadian citizenship. By repeatedly
ruling against Quebec in matters of language policy, the Court has denied the
province its historical role in defining Canadian cultural citizenship. Quebec’s
political claims contributed to making Canada a federal state in 1867, and later
to making it officially bilingual in 1969. Canada’s new constitutional order has,
however, made it more difficult for Quebec to further the multinational character
of Canadian citizenship. Instead, Canada appears to be headed towards a more
undifferentiated citizenship in which individual rights are favoured.
This phenomenon is not new. What is novel is the extent to which this
individualization of Canadian citizenship is occurring. Pierre Elliott Trudeau’s
vision of an undifferentiated citizenship clearly had an impact on Canada, with
the entrenchment of the Charter in 1982.195 Early jurisprudence in the area of
linguistic rights in Quebec constituted a first step in applying this new vision, in
which Anglophones’ group-differentiated rights, which are exercised individually, were promoted to the detriment of Quebec’s self-government rights. Quebec
193. See Charles-Emmanuel Côté & Guy Tremblay, “Un remède durable,” La Presse (24
November 2009) A21; Guy Tremblay, “La portée élargie de la procédure bilatérale de
modification de la Constitution du Canada” (2011) 41:2 RGD 417.
194. See Cameron & Jacqueline, supra note 102.
195. See Jenson, “Citizenship and Equity,” supra note 64; Russell, “Political,” supra note 6;
Daniel M Weinstock, “The Moral Psychology of Federalism” in Jean-François GaudreaultDesBiens & Fabien Gélinas, eds, The States and Moods of Federalism: Governance, Identity and
Methodology (Cowansville, Que: Yvon Blais, 2005) 209.

RICHEZ, LOSING RELEVANCE 231

nonetheless retained some policy tools with which to preserve its cultural distinctiveness by integrating immigrants into the French education system. Recent
Charter jurisprudence has challenged these tools, however, by recognizing the
purely individual right of Allophones and Francophones to access publicly
funded English schools in Quebec in some circumstances, thereby increasing
language substitution to the benefit of the English language. This change has
marked an even bolder step towards an undifferentiated Canadian citizenship.
From a constitutional, jurisprudential, and normative perspective, however,
Quebec has a justifiable claim to differential treatment.196 To begin, Canada’s
constitutional edifice contains asymmetrical arrangements that give Quebec a
de facto special status. Following the British Conquest, the Quebec Act, 1774
restored the use of the Civil Code in private matters in Quebec,197 making
modern Quebec the only Canadian province with a civilian legal tradition. By
establishing Canada’s federal structure, the Constitution Act, 1867 ensured that
Quebec would be the only province with a Francophone majority. The Constitution Act, 1867 also made Quebec the only province (for the time being) in which
the use of French and English in the legislature and the courts is constitutionally
protected.198 Furthermore, Quebec is the only province to be exempted from the
mother tongue clause in section 23 of the Charter.199
The recognition of differential treatment for Quebec also has a jurisprudential basis in the case of minority language education. Justice Giroux’s minority
opinion at the Quebec Court of Appeal in Nguyen made a compelling argument
for why parts of Bill 104 did not contravene section 23(2) of the Charter.200
Justice Giroux refused to apply section 23(2) literally to grant a child the right to
public minority language education after a short or significant stay in a private
minority language school. Adopting a contextual approach, he argued that past
judgments of the Court have established that the interpretation of section 23
196. See e.g. Benoît Pelletier, Une certaine idée du Québec: Parcours d’un fédéraliste. De la réflexion
à l’action (Quebec: Presses de l’Université Laval, 2010) at 15-28; Henri Brun, Guy Tremblay
& Eugénie Brouillet, Droit constitutionnel, 5th ed (Cowansville, Que: Yvon Blais, 2008) at
890-91.
197. (UK), 14 Geo III, c 83.
198. The Manitoba Act, 1870 later protected the use of the French and English languages in the
province’s legislature and courts. See Manitoba Act, 1870 (UK) 33 Vict, c 3, reprinted in
RSC 1985, App II, No 8. In 1982, ss 16-22 of the Charter gave French and English the
status of official languages in the operations of the government of New Brunswick. See
Charter, supra note 1, ss 16-22.
199. Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 53, s 59.
200. HN c Québec (Ministre de l’Éducation), [2007] RJQ 2097 at paras 235-99 (available on
CanLII), Giroux JA, dissenting.
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should take into account the specific linguistic dynamic of each province201 and
accordingly allow for different solutions.202 Furthermore, the Court has specifically noted that the linguistic concerns of the French majority in Quebec have a
role to play in the interpretation of linguistic rights:
[R]ules to govern language rights … also inevitably have an impact on how Quebec’s
French-speaking community perceives its future in Canada, … and even more so
in North America as a whole. To this picture must be added the serious difficulties
resulting from the rate of assimilation of French-speaking minority groups outside
Quebec, whose current language rights were acquired only recently, at considerable
expense and with great difficulty. Thus in interpreting these rights, the courts have
a responsibility to reconcile sometimes divergent interests and priorities, and to be
sensitive to the future of each language community.203

Considering that Quebec was concerned with both the integration of
newcomers and the growing phenomenon of “bridging schools,” Justice Giroux
argued that section 23 of the Charter gave Quebec the necessary latitude to
restrict access to English schools.
From a normative perspective, the substantive equality of French and English
is better achieved through recognition of a special status for Quebec, rather than
through the application of constitutional parallelism in matters of minority
language education. According to Carolyn J. Tuohy, the legal parallel treatment
of English and French in the jurisprudence on minority-language education
rights originates from the myth of two founding nations.204 However, constitutional parallelism does not reflect reality: the two “founding nations,” namely
French Canadians and English Canadians, cannot be said to be on equal footing

201. In Public Schools Act (Man), Lamer CJ noted that “different interpretative approaches may
well have to be taken in different jurisdictions, sensitive to the unique blend of linguistic
dynamics that have developed in each province.” See Public Schools Act (Man), supra note
174 at 851; In Solski, the Court noted that “[t]he application of s. 23 is contextual. It must
take into account the very real differences between the situations of the minority language
community in Quebec and the minority language communities of the territories and the
other provinces.” See Solski, supra note 8 at para 34.
202. In Gosselin, the Court noted that “[i]f the problems are different, the solutions will not
necessarily be the same.” See Gosselin, supra note 7 at para 31.
203. Solski, supra note 8 at para 5.
204. Supra note 141.
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in a demographic sense.205 Furthermore, the precarious status of Francophone
minorities outside Quebec does not compare to the special status that has been
established for the Anglophone minority in Quebec. The latter can be qualified as
a “dominant minority” due to its direct tie to the English majority in Canada.206
Interestingly, all the rights demanded by Francophones outside Quebec had
already been granted to Anglo-Quebeckers before the enactment of the Charter.
Quebec guaranteed its historical Anglophone minority access to publicly funded
English instruction,207 as well as management and control of its schools,208
irrespective of whether the number of students warranted these rights in particular
geographical areas. Furthermore, the rights claims to which the Court responded
favourably in Quebec, to the dismay of the Francophone majority, would not
have been issues in the rest of Canada, where Anglophones do not feel that the
English language is threatened by language substitution to the benefit of French.
Thus, only by promoting French inside and outside Quebec will the language
have a chance to thrive in Canada.
In the end, Quebec’s prospects of finding a solution to its lack of special
status are grim, should it decide to stay within the Canadian constitutional
bosom. The reality of Canadian politics limits the possibility of amending the
Constitution.209 Today, constitutional modification is achieved mostly through
rights-based judicial review, and to a lesser extent by the establishment of new
conventions. Thus, as it stands, Quebec must accept that it has lost some relevance
in the constitutional politics of language.

205. Statistics Canada has reported that 56.9 per cent of Canadians have English as a mother
tongue, while only 21.3 per cent of Canadians have French as a mother tongue. See
Statistics Canada, Population by mother tongue and age groups (total), percentage distribution
(2011), for Canada, provinces and territories, online: <http://www12.statcan.gc.ca/censusrecensement/2011/dp-pd/hlt-fst/lang/Pages/highlight.cfm?TabID=1&Lang=E&Asc=0&PRC
ode=01&OrderBy=1&View=2&tableID=401&queryID=1&Age=1>.
206. José Woehrling, “Minority Cultural and Linguistic Rights and Equality Rights in the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms” (1985) 31:1 McGill LJ 50.
207. Bill 101, supra note 30, s 73. Although Bill 101 required protestant school boards to use
French in their internal and external communications, this problem was remedied with the
adoption of Bill 58. See Bill 58, supra note 167.
208. The Quebec Anglophone community has enjoyed control over its own education system
since Confederation in 1867. See Garth Stevenson, Community Besieged: The Anglophone
Minority and the Politics of Quebec (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1999) at 26.
209. See especially Allan C Cairns, Charter versus Federalism: The Dilemmas of Constitutional
Reform (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1992); Christopher P Manfredi &
Michael Lusztig, “Why do Formal Amendments Fail? An Institutional Design Analysis”
(1998) 50:3 World Pol 377; Russell, Constitutional Odyssey, supra note 102.

